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Abstract
Ghosts are economic agents who evade taxes by failing to file a return. Knowing nothing
about them, the tax agency is unable to track them down through audit strategies which are
based on reported income. The present paper develops a simple model of the audit decision
for a ghost−busting tax agency which bases its audit strategy on signals of prosperous living,
such as ownership of high−quality housing. Ghosts have a preference for high−quality
housing, but may opt to own houses of a lower quality so as to escape detection. The paper
compares the optimal audit rules and net tax collection under signal and blind auditing of the
non−declaring population, deriving conditions under which each strategy will dominate the
other.
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Ghosts, in tax administration jargon, are economic agents (individuals or firms) who 
evade their taxes by failing to file an income tax return. Knowing nothing about them, 
the tax agency (henceforth, the IRS) is unable to track them down through audit 
strategies which are based on reported income. Although posing a major challenge for 
the design of audit policy, the phenomenon of ghosts has gained very little attention in 
the tax compliance literature.
1 A notable exception are Cowell and Gordon (1997), 
who demonstrated, in a context of sales tax evasion, that the existence of ghosts might 
cause a policy as unsophisticated as random audit to dominate a deterministic strategy 
such as Reinganum and Wilde’s (1985) cut-off rule.
2 Cowell and Gordon, however, 
addressed the problem of audit design in the presence of ghosts. No strategy has been 
offered in the literature for auditing ghosts themselves.      
 
How then can the IRS track down ghosts? One possibility is to use the population 
census to investigate individuals of working age who have never filed a return. 
Another option is to rely on paid informants.
3 Yet there seems to be a more promising 
way of searching for ghosts. As Cowell (1990) remarked, "even ghosts provide 
information if you know where to look" (p. 180). Unlike their macabre counterparts, 
tax ghosts want to live. And since they have evaded their taxes, they may have the 
ability to live well. The  IRS  may  therefore  look  for  signals  of  prosperous  living  
(e.g., villas,  yachts, 
 latest-model  cars)  in the economy and audit big spenders for 
whom it has no records: anyone who spends lavishly but does not declare an income 
is a likely suspect.
4 
 
The present paper develops a simple model of the audit decision for a ghost-busting 
IRS which bases its audit strategy on the premise that one who appears to be living 
well must be of taxable capacity. More specifically, the IRS is assumed to observe 
individuals’ ownership of high-quality housing, auditing a revenue-maximizing 
fraction of house owners who did not file a return. Ghosts have a preference for high-
quality housing but, informed of the IRS strategy, may opt to own houses of a lower 
quality so as to escape detection. The paper compares the optimal audit rules and net 
tax collection under signal and blind auditing of the non-declaring population, 
showing that signal auditing will unambiguously dominate blind auditing when the 
burden of taxes is sufficiently low. Otherwise, blind auditing may be a dominant 
strategy, the conditions for which are formally derived.     
 
 
                                               
                                         2. THE FORMAL SETTING 
 
Consider an economy consisting of workers and retirees only. A fraction α of the 
population participates in the labor force and a fraction 1−α retires. Suppose that 
income can take just two values, high and low. A fraction β of the labor force earns 
the high income, h, and a fraction 1−β earns the low income. Suppose further that 
retirement is not compulsory, but rather an option considered by individuals who 
earned the high income in the past. Retirees and low income earners are exempt from 
paying taxes. Only high income earners must pay part of their income, x (< h), as 
taxes. The IRS does not observe income directly. High income earners are thus 




earner might,  however,  evade  his  taxes  through  avoiding  declaration,   
consequently  becoming  a  ghost.
5 If caught, he will be obliged to pay a penalty in 
proportion λ to his evaded tax. His total payments to the IRS would then amount to fx, 
where f = 1 + λ. The IRS cannot influence x and f, which are determined in the law. 
Its sole objective is to select an audit strategy which maximizes the collection of tax 
revenue net of audit costs.  
 
Individuals live in owned housing. There are only two types of housing, villas and 
apartments, denoted by V and A, respectively. A villa is of a higher quality than an 
apartment, thus more expensive to own (i.e. to purchase and maintain). Low income 
earners cannot afford to own a villa. Only high income earners (whether declaring 
their income or not) can. The IRS observes villas, viewing them as a signal of taxable 
capacity. However, villas may also be owned by retirees who earned the high income 
in the past and purchased their villas at that time.
6 By assumption, retirees do not owe 
taxes on past income (e.g., there was no income tax in the past).  
 
High income earners are risk neutral. Their utility function is defined on the quality of 
housing, S (= V, A), and on income left for the consumption of other products. That is, 
U = (I − πs) + u(S), where I represents after-tax income and πS (= πV , πA) denotes 
house owning costs. We may rewrite the utility function as U = I + ϕ(S), where ϕ(S) = 
u(S) − πS  denotes the utility derived from housing net of owning costs. For any given 
level of after-tax income, a high income earner is assumed to be better off owning a 
villa than in an apartment, hence ϕ(V) > ϕ(A). Still, he may opt to own an apartment if 




3.  BLIND AUDITING 
 
Suppose first that the IRS audits a fraction p of the non-declaring population, 
irrespective of villa owning (henceforth, “blind auditing”). A high income earner, 
informed of the IRS policy, will thus choose to own a villa regardless of whether or 
not he evades his taxes. Consequently, his decision of whether to declare his income 
or to become a ghost reduces to comparing his (expected) after-tax income in each 
case. He will become a ghost if h − pfx > h − x and declare otherwise.
7 Hence, he will 
become a ghost if  p < 1/f, and comply with the tax law if  p ≥ 1/f.  
 
The IRS chooses an audit rate p* which maximizes its expected net revenue, R, 
recognizing that the probability of a randomly audited individual to be of high income 
is αβ. Denoting by c the audit cost per unit, expected net revenue will be                             
 
                                 R
fx c pN if p
f



















                           (1) 
  
where N denotes the population size. Notice that if  p ≥ 1/f, the IRS is bound to audit 




their income. While the IRS must commit to this policy if it wishes to induce honesty, 
it will never raise p above 1/f, as this would only increase audit costs without 
generating any additional revenue. Clearly, inducing honesty will be desirable if it 
raises more net revenue than a less stringent policy. A prerequisite for this is, of 
course, that the net revenue is positive; i.e., that tax collection, αβxN, is at least as 
high as collection costs, p(1−αβ)cN. Substituting p = 1/f reveals immediately that this 
condition also guarantees that inducing honesty is preferable to providing incentives 
for evasion through lowering the audit rate below 1/f.
8 We thus conclude that the 
optimal audit rule for the IRS is                                                                               
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                                                 4. SIGNAL AUDITING  
 
Suppose now that the IRS audits a fraction p of villa owners who have not declared 
their income (henceforth, “signal auditing”). A high income earner, informed of the 
IRS policy, must now choose between three options:  
 
(a) Declaring his income (henceforth ”complying”), in which case his utility will be   
   ϕ(V) + h − x. 
(b) Becoming a ghost and purchasing a villa (henceforth, “signaling”), in which case 
his expected utility will be ϕ(V) + h − pfx. 
(c) Becoming a ghost and purchasing an apartment (henceforth, “sheltering”), in 
which case his utility will be ϕ(A) + h. 
 
While the second option transmits a signal to the IRS and is thus subject to the risk of 
detection, the third option provides a shelter from detection, guaranteeing foolproof 
evasion.  
 
Notice now that in case of complying, the taxes paid, x, result in a utility loss of the 
same magnitude. Hence, x may also be interpreted as the disutility to the individual of 
paying taxes, henceforth referred to as the “tax burden”. This burden could have been 
avoided through sheltering evasion and giving up utility of ϕ(V) − ϕ(A). Complying 
thus implies that the extra utility gained from purchasing a villa rather than an 
apartment exceeds the tax burden. Denoting  $ x ≡ ϕ(V) − ϕ(A), consider the following 
proposition: 
 
Proposition 1: (a) if x  ≤  $ x, a high income earner will always purchase a villa, 
irrespective of the level of enforcement, complying if  p ≥ 1/f  and signaling if  p < 1/f. 
(b) if x > $ x, a high income earner will always become a ghost, irrespective of the level 





To prove proposition 1, consider first the individual’s choice between complying and 
sheltering. Comparing the utility levels of these options reveals immediately that 
complying will be preferable to sheltering if x ≤  $ x: because the tax burden is low, a 
high income earner will be better off paying his taxes and living in a villa than 
becoming a ghost and living in an apartment. However, when x > $ x, sheltering will be 
preferable to complying, as the tax burden will more than offset the extra benefit from 
living in a villa. Consider now the individual’s choice between complying and 
signaling. Clearly, complying will be preferable if p ≥ 1/f and signaling otherwise, 
since only in the latter case the expected profit from evasion, (1−p)x − p(f−1)x, will be 
positive. This proves part (a) of Proposition 1. Suppose now that x >$ x, for which 
complying is inferior to sheltering, and consider the individual’s choice between 
signaling and sheltering. Clearly, signaling will be preferable if p  ≤  $ x/fx  and 
sheltering otherwise, which proves part (b) of Proposition 1. Figure 1 illustrates these 
results graphically. 
 
Whenever the tax and law enforcement parameters induce high income earners to 
purchase villas, the number of villa owners in the economy will equal the number of 
high income earners in the labor force, αβN, plus the number of retirees who have had 
high income in the past and purchased their villas at that time, (1−α)N. This amounts 
to a total of δN villa owners, where δ ≡ αβ + (1−α) < 1. The probability that a 
randomly audited villa owner is presently of high income is αβ /δ.   
 
When x  ≤  $ x, expected net revenue for the IRS will be (αβfx/δ − c)pδN  if  0 ≤  p < 1/f  
and [αβx/δ −  p(1−αβ/δ)c]δN if p ≥ 1/f. Simplifying, expected net revenue can be 
rewritten as:                   
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Notice that setting p ≥ 1/f implies now that the IRS will be auditing retired villa 
owners only, as villa owners who are currently earning the high income are induced to 
declare their income. Notice also that because δ <1 and 1−α < 1−αβ, audit costs are 
lower under signal auditing than under blind auditing, whether the audit probability 
induces honesty or not. The reason for this is that the villa owners’ population, δN, is 
smaller than the total population, N, hence, for any given probability of audit less 
individuals must be audited under the former strategy than under the latter.  
 
 
Following the arguments of the previous section, the optimal audit rule in the case of 
x ≤  $ x will be  
 


























However, when x > $ x, expected net revenue will be given by 
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Notice that if p >  $ x/fx, the IRS will gain nothing in revenue, auditing retired villa 
owners only, as current high income earners are induced to shelter their evasion 
through the purchase of apartments. The optimal audit rule for the IRS thus becomes  
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Because honesty cannot be induced in this case, the only possible way for the IRS to 
collect some revenue is to induce ghosts to reveal themselves through signaling. This 




                                   5. SIGNAL VERSUS BLIND AUDITING  
 
We now compare the desirability to the IRS of adopting the alternative audit 
strategies, distinguishing between the case of x ≤  $ x and x > $ x. In any given case, one 
strategy will be said to dominate the other if there exists a set of parameter values for 
which it yields more net revenue than the other and there exists no set of parameter 
values for which it yields less revenue than the other. 
 
Proposition 2: (a) if x ≤  $ x, signal auditing will always dominate blind auditing. (b) if 
x > $ x, signal auditing will dominate blind auditing if αβfx < (1−αβ)c; otherwise, blind 
auditing will dominate signal auditing if αβfx < δc or if αβfx ≥ δc and (1−αβ) ≤ δ.    
 
To prove Proposition 2, consider first the case of x ≤  $ x and suppose that αβfx ≥ 
(1−αβ)c. The optimal  policy under blind auditing will be to set the audit rate at 1/f 
and induce honesty. Because 1−αβ > 1−α, this will also be the optimal policy under 
signal auditing, only net revenue will be higher because audit costs are lower. Hence, 
signal auditing will dominate blind auditing. Suppose, alternatively, that αβfx < 
(1−αβ)c. The optimal policy under blind auditing will be to set the audit probability at 
zero and gain no tax revenue. If αβfx < (1−α)c, this will also be the optimal policy 
under signal auditing. However, if αβfx ≥ (1−α)c, the optimal policy under signal 
auditing will be to audit with probability 1/f  and induce honesty. Hence, signal 
auditing will again dominate blind auditing. This proves part (a) of Proposition 2.  
 
Consider now the case of x >$ x and suppose first that αβfx < (1−αβ)c. Under blind 
auditing, net revenue will be zero. If αβfx <δc, net revenue will be zero under signal 




be to audit with p =  $ x/fx  and gain positive revenue. Hence, signal auditing will 
dominate blind auditing. Suppose, alternatively, that αβfx ≥ (1−αβ)c. Under blind 
auditing, the optimal policy is to induce honesty. If αβfx <δc, blind auditing will 
certainly dominate signal auditing, as the optimal policy under the latter strategy is 
not to audit at all. If, alternatively, αβfx ≥δc, the optimal policy under signal auditing 
is to audit as well, yet at a lower intensity than under blind auditing. If (1−αβ)>δ, net 
revenue per audit will be higher under signal auditing, thus the latter strategy may 
dominate the former. However, if (1−αβ)  ≤  δ, blind auditing will unambiguously 
dominate signal auditing, being carried out more intensively as well as yielding a 




                                                     6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The present paper has developed a simple model of tax evasion with two types of 
agents, workers and retirees, two levels of income, high and low, and two forms of 
observable consumption, apartments and villas. Villas are affordable by high income 
earners only (whether working or retired). Retirees and low income earners are 
exempt from paying taxes. High income earners owe taxes but may evade this liability 
by not declaring their income, consequently becoming ghosts. Ghosts have a 
preference for villas, but may opt to live in apartments so as to avoid drawing the 
IRS’s attention.   
 
Perceiving villa ownership as a signal of taxable capacity, the paper has focused on 
the desirability for the IRS of tracking down ghosts through auditing villa owners who 
have not declared their income. A crucial factor affecting the desirability of signal 
auditing is the burden of taxes as compared to the extra utility derived from owning a 
villa. When the tax burden is low, high income earners would be better off paying 
their taxes and living in villas than becoming ghosts and living in apartments. They 
might take their chances and evade taxes, but will still be holding on to their villas. 
Under these circumstances, the IRS would be better off inducing honesty through the 
less costly strategy of signal auditing than through blindly auditing the non-declaring 
population. Furthermore, because signal auditing is less costly, it may still be a 
profitable strategy when blind auditing is too expensive to operate. However, when 
the tax burden is high, high income earners would never pay their taxes. They would 
turn into ghosts, opting to live in apartments and shelter their evasion if auditing is too 
intensive. To induce ghosts to reveal themselves through villa ownership, the IRS 
must lower the audit rate. Consequently, signal auditing might end up yielding less net 
















                                                             N O T E S 
 
 
1 There have been some attempts to model the individual's failure to file a return or to 
provide empirical evidence on the characteristics of non-filers. Yaniv (1988) modeled 
the employee's decision to evade his non-withheld taxes through non-filing and the 
consequent effect on his supply of labor. Crane and Nourzad (1993) identified the 
features that distinguish non-filers from under-reporters, whereas Erard and Ho (1999)  
estimated an empirical model of the non-filing decision, comparing filers' and non-
filers' characteristics and assessing non-filers' tax liabilities.    
 
2 The reason for this surprising result is that the cut-off scheme, which audits all firms 
declaring a turnover below some cut-off level and ignores the others, might provide 
incentives for firms to become ghosts rather than to declare the cut-off level. 
 
3 See Yaniv (2001) for an analysis of the individual's decision of whether to inform 
the IRS about other people's evasion and of the IRS’s problem of selecting an optimal 
reward for informants. 
 
4 In Israel, for example, where withholding rates reach as high as the final tax rates, a 
wage-earner who  holds  a  single  job  and  whose income does not exceed a certain 
ceiling is exempt from filing a
 return. However, once he buys a new car he is likely to 
receive a letter from the tax agency requiring him to declare his income over the past 
three years. As reported in Wilkenfeld (1973), taxpayers are quite aware of the signals 
they transmit to tax inspectors: some taxpayers, attempting to bargain down an 
assessment of their earning capacity, would deliberately put on their most ragged 
clothing before visiting the income tax office.
 
 
5 Notice that because low income earners are exempt from declaring their income, a 
high income earner cannot evade taxes by declaring the low income
 
 
6 Notice that because retirement is not compulsory, the IRS cannot tell by the age of 
the individual whether he is retired or not. 
 
7 More fully, a high income earner will become a ghost if the maximum value of his 
expected utility if becoming a ghost exceeds the maximum value of his utility if 
declaring his income. Since ϕ(V)>ϕ (A), he will become a ghost if ϕ(V) + h − pfx > 
ϕ(V) + h − x, or if  h − pfx > h − x
 
 
8 Substituting  p = 1/f  in [αx −  p(1−α)c]N , the net revenue when inducing honesty 
may be written as [αfx − (1−α)c](1/f)N. This is greater than the net revenue expected 
when allowing for evasion through lowering the audit probability, (αfx − c)pN, as 
(1−α)c < c and 1/f > p.   
 
9 Chaudhuri addresses the issue of dynamic auditing, investigating, under proportional 
taxation of two income levels (high and low), whether or not auditing rules should be 
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